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 It is generally conceded that Vice President Cheney has been our most influential vice president.  
During his two terms, the office assumed a significance which his predecessors, even those who 
themselves were quite significant, would not have thought possible.  Whereas historically the vice 
presidency had been dismissed as too feeble, the Cheney vice presidency was attacked as too robust.   
 The unprecedented power of Cheney as vice president had many sources.  One of them was the 
war on terror.  It, of course, assumed an unexpected prominence  after 9/11, and the war on terror 
contributed to Cheney’s ascendance and provided the political theatre  in which his unique vice-
presidential role was performed.  The war on terror allowed for an expansion of executive power 
generally in a manner which extended presidential power beyond its normal sphere  even while the vice 
presidency itself occupied a larger space in the executive branch. 
 This paper will explore the unprecedented nature of the Cheney vice presidency, relating its 
growth to the war on terror, and suggesting ways in which during Cheney’s tenure the office escaped 
conventional sources of vice-presidential accountability.    The Cheney vice presidency avoided many of 
the constraints which presidential leadership normally imposes as well as those forms of accountability 
which are rooted in the political system.  Moreover, normal patterns of vice-presidential self-restraint 
often seemed absent, perhaps related to the other two developments.   
 The patterns of the Cheney tenure are unlikely to become permanent, rooted as they were in a 
distinctive set of circumstances.  It is hard to imagine another president allowing the vice president such 
latitude, another vice president flexing such muscle, or circumstances occurring which were so 
conducive to so expansive a vice-presidential role.  Nonetheless, the Cheney tenure provides yet 
another model of vice-presidential  conduct and furnishes a case study against which to test certain 
ideas about the vice presidency in particular and concepts about the institutional design of American 










Separation of powers and the related doctrine of checks and balances are prominent among the 
ways the Constitution seeks to prevent the concentration of state power and to promote good 
governmental decision-making.  “If men were angels, no government would be necessary,” James 
Madison famously observed.  Since they are not, Mr. Madison and his colleagues concluded that 
“auxiliary precautions,” in addition to elections, were needed to impose suitable controls on 
government.  “Ambition must be made to counteract ambition,” Mr. Madison prescribed.1  The 
framers created a system of institutions with allocated, but interdependent, governmental power in 
an  attempt to provide a deliberative and accountable government which  would preserve 
individual liberty.    
 War invariably puts the greatest stress on that system.  The events of September 11, 2001  
were no exception.  They helped relax traditional checks on the power of the executive branch, allowing 
the president to exercise greater power than under normal circumstances.  They also were associated 
with a second, closely related, institutional development, an enormous and unprecedented rise in the 
power of the vice presidency or at least of its occupant during the Bush terms, Dick Cheney.  During 
those years, some even took to referring to “the Imperial Vice Presidency.”2   Even if some such claims 
regarding Cheney’s power were inflated, the fact of the assertion was itself suggestive; the oxymoron 
previously would have been unimaginable. 
These two developments were reciprocally related; Vice President Cheney worked to stretch 
executive power and the growth of executive power expanded his own domain and influence.    
Although the war on terror contributed to these two developments in important ways, it was not solely 
responsible for either the growth of the presidency or of the vice presidency which occurred during the 
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 See e.g., Editorial, Cheney: The Imperial Veep, Philadelphia Inquirer, June 23, 2007, at A08.  See also Shirley Anne 
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Bush years.  On the contrary, both developments would have transpired, no doubt differently and in less 
robust ways, but occurred nonetheless, independent of the war on terror. 
From the outset, the expansion of presidential powers was a fundamental objective of the Bush 
presidency, its prominent place on the agenda traceable to Cheney’s influence.  Well before the hijacked 
planes struck the twin towers of the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, Cheney was in the forefront 
of an effort to assert presidential powers and to elevate the presidency at the expense of Congress. 
 Although the war on terror expanded Cheney’s influence, his unprecedented role had 
independent sources which were firmly in place well before September 11, 2001 and which were also 
critical.  This confluence of factors, the war on terror and Cheney’s other, unique sources of power,  
created a situation which raised novel and fundamental questions regarding the political accountability 
of a vice president.   Cheney’s power depended in large part on the absence of less formal, but 
conventional, restraints on vice-presidential conduct which operated in other recent administrations. 
The Cheney vice presidency avoided many of the constraints which presidential leadership and the 
political system normally imposed.  The Cheney vice presidency reflected a culture of political 
unaccountability which transcended the separation of powers debates regarding presidential power.  
Cheney helped engineer the erosion of these restraints with the actual or tacit support of President 
Bush.  These factors, in addition to the Bush-Cheney views on presidential power, influenced the nature 
and content of policy-making during the Bush administration. 
 This paper will explore the relationship of the war on terror to the unique Cheney vice 
presidency.  Section I will outline the contours of the vice presidency when Cheney assumed it.  Section 
II will explore ways in which, and reasons why, Cheney was able to stretch those boundaries during the  
7 1/2 months before 9/11.  Section III will explore Cheney’s long-standing commitment to the growth of 
presidential power and outline steps taken before 9/11 to inflate presidential power.  Section IV will 
examine the impact on 9/11 on the distribution of governmental power and suggest that it led to 
concentrating greater systemic power in the presidency with much of that power flowing to the vice 
president.  Section V will show the way in which Cheney’s power was enhanced by factors which were 
unrelated to traditional separation of powers concerns.  These included a) Bush’s style of presidential 
leadership which imposed fewer checks than normal on vice-presidential behavior; b) the absence of a 
regular decision-making process in the Bush White House to ensure a full airing of competing views ; c) 
Cheney’s conduct of his vice presidency in a manner which ignored traditional conventions of vice-
presidential self-restraint; d) Cheney’s lack of presidential ambitions which gave him greater leeway to 
pursue independent agendas; e) Cheney’s influence over the bureaucracy which was traceable to his 
role in the transition; f) Cheney’s aversion to the media; g)Cheney’s rejection of bipartisanship and 
bilateralism.  These factors freed Cheney from conventional modes of accountability and allowed for 
policy formulation which, in many instances was not deliberative.   
I. The Modern Vice Presidency as of 2001 
By the time Cheney became vice president, the office had undergone institutional changes 
which promised significance to any occupant of that office.    Vice presidents beginning with Richard M. 
Nixon had gravitated to the executive branch where they assumed a range of traditional roles.  They 
headed commissions in the executive branch, represented the president as a foreign emissary, served as 
an administration spokesman, and functioned as a party campaigner and fundraiser.  These 
developments were important transitional steps in the institutional development of the office.3  
Nonetheless, they did not bring the office into the inner core of the administration and  vice presidents  
continued to feel excluded and frustrated. 
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 See generally Joel K. Goldstein, The Modern American Vice Presidency: The Transformation of a Political 
Institution (1982) 
During the presidency of Jimmy Carter, the vice presidency was transformed.   Carter’s vice 
president, Walter F. Mondale, was involved in the work of the executive branch on an ongoing basis as a 
senior adviser and troubleshooter who performed substantive, not make-work, assignments.  Carter 
gave Mondale important new resources—a prominent office on the ground floor of the West Wing, a 
regular private lunch meeting with Carter each week, the right to attend any meeting Carter had, easy 
access to the Oval Office, inclusion in the distribution list for documents sent to the president, and 
integration of the vice-presidential staff in the operation of the White House.  It would have been 
awkward for any new president to retract them and Mondale’s successors all retained those privileges.  
Mondale’s tenure created new expectations for the office.  Although, for a variety of reasons, neither 
George H.W. Bush nor Dan Quayle achieved Mondale’s significance as vice president, each had access to 
the President and played important roles in their administrations.  And Al Gore expanded on the roles of 
his predecessors.  He was not only Bill Clinton’s most significant across the board adviser, he also 
assumed major substantive responsibilities on an ongoing basis.  He was responsible for the reinventing 
government initiative as well as for environmental and telecommunications policy and he headed 
important bilateral commissions with his counterparts in Russia, South Africa and Egypt.4  Vice 
Presidents Mondale, Bush, Quayle and Gore were distinct political figures who experienced different 
levels of influence as vice president.  Yet they all benefited from enhanced opportunities to contribute 
which separated them from the experience of their pre-Mondale predecessors. 
II. Cheney and Vice Presidential Power: Pre 9/11 
A. The Cheney Vice Presidency 
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 See generally Joel K. Goldstein, The Rising Power of the Modern Vice Presidency, 38 Presidential Stud. Q. 374 
(2008) 
By January, 2001, this new vice presidency had become institutionalized.  In many respects, 
Cheney’s decision to accept the vice-presidential nomination recognized this historic  development  of 
the office.  Cheney was not someone who was drawn to sinecures, having served as Chief of Staff to 
President Gerald Ford while still in his 30s, Republican House Minority Whip, and Secretary of Defense 
(not to mention Chief Executive Officer of Halliburton).   He thought the second office sufficiently robust 
to be a desirable job in itself independent of its value as a political springboard. What better 
confirmation could there be of the significance of the vice presidency?   
Yet the experience of Cheney’s four immediate predecessors did not predict the Cheney vice 
presidency.  In this instance, the past was not really prologue, or if it was, in a  very understated way.    
From the outset of the Bush administration Cheney played a role which was unprecedented in its range  
and significance.5 
Cheney’s influence became apparent during the early months of the Bush administration.  
Cheney had easy access to Bush and he and his staff participated fully in White House discussions and 
operations.  Bush assigned Cheney to supervise the development of administration policy in a number of 
critical areas and enlisted Cheney’s help in working with the Senate and House of Representatives on a 
range of legislative matters.6 In late January, 2001,  Bush named Cheney to head a Cabinet level  energy 
task force to develop policy recommendations to address a range of problems relating to the cost and 
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 Cheney tended to minimize his role in public speeches.   On one occasion he recalled his time as a scholar at the 
American Enterprise Institute as “a time when I had an office, a small staff, and not much in the way of actual 
responsibility.  It turned out to be a lot like the vice presidency.”  Richard B. Cheney, Vice Presidential Remarks at 
American Enterprise Institute Annual Dinner, Washington, D.C. (February 10, 2004) http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2004/02/20040212-2.html 
6 See generally Scott McClellan, What Happened: Inside the Bush White House and 
Washington’s Culture of Deception 85 (2008); Remarks by the Vice President-Elect with 
Senator Joseph Lieberman, December 21, 2000  American Presidency Project  
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=84904&st=cheney&st1= 
 
supply of energy.7    In early May, 2001, he named Cheney to head a task force on domestic 
preparedness against weapons of mass destruction in the hands of terrorists.  Cheney was “to oversee 
the development of a coordinated national effort so that we may do the very best possible job of 
protecting our people from catastrophic harm” from the use of weapons of mass destruction by rogue 
states or non-state terrorist entities.8 
Cheney also represented the administration in working with Congress on the details of the 2001 
tax cut.   Congressmen concluded that Cheney had the authority to make a deal which increased their 
interest in working with him.9  Cheney managed to walk Bush away from his campaign promise to 
require power plants to reduce their toxic emissions to combat global warming. 10   Bush also named 
Cheney to head a five person11  Budget Review Board to consider  appeals from OMB decisions with 
which departmental heads were unhappy.  Other members viewed Cheney’s role as critical.  Sometimes 
he forced modifications.  Cabinet members could appeal the Board’s decisions to Bush but they never 
did, in part a tribute to Cheney’s perceived influence.12 
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 President George W. Bush Remarks Prior to a Meeting With the National Energy Policy Development Group and 
an Exchange With Reporters (Jan. 29, 2001) American Presidency Project 
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 President George W. Bush, Statement by the President, Domestic Preparedness Against Weapons of Mass 
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 The members were the Vice President, Secretary of the Treasury, Director of OMB, Chief of Staff and Director of 
the National Economic Council 
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 Stephen F.Hayes, Cheney: The Untold Story of America’s Most Powerful and Controversial Vice President 407-
408 (2007). 
By March, 2001, former chiefs of staff to Vice Presidents Mondale, Bush and Gore all agreed 
that the Cheney vice presidency marked a new departure.13  Craig Fuller, the chief of staff to George H. 
W. Bush during his second vice-presidential term, observed that Cheney “is definitely serving in a way 
that's unprecedented.”   Cheney was “setting the agenda” and “playing a role that is unique in anything 
we've seen in history.”14   Ron Klain, a chief of staff to Vice President Al Gore (and later to Vice President 
Joe Biden) agreed that Cheney “clearly is functioning in a way broader than any previous vice president 
has” with “broad, cross-cutting responsibilities for not just … being part of the agenda but setting the 
agenda, managing the White House and managing the direction of the Bush administration.”15  The 
following month, former Reagan Chief of Staff Kenneth Duberstein observed that  for “the first time in 
our history we’ve had a president and a prime minister.”  Presidential and vice-presidential scholar 
Paul Light thought comparisons of Cheney to other vice presidents understated Cheney’s 
significance.  Light saw Cheney as a combination “’chief of staff, the senior cabinet secretary, the 
chairman of the kitchen cabinet, the president’s best friend and mentor, all rolled into one.’”16 
 Cheney’s conduct on September 11, 2001 confirmed his unique stature.   Bush was on the road 
that day, meeting with a second grade class in Sarasota, Florida when he learned of the terrorist attack. 
“We’re at war.  Get me the Vice President and get me the Director of the FBI,” Bush reportedly declared 
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 The NewsHour with Jim Lehrer: The Cheney Factor (PBS television broadcast Mar. 12, 2001), available at 
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 Martin Kettle, Hidden Powerhouse of the US Presidency, Guardian (London) Apr. 28, 2001 , at 19 available at 
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after leaving the classroom.17   Cheney was the authority figure in the Presidential Emergency 
Operations Center after the White House was evacuated and the pivotal operating figure in the 
government that day.  Pictures from the command center depict Cheney’s dominance and all accounts 
confirm that impression.  He persuaded Bush not to return to the White House even after Bush had 
publicly announced that as his destination.   When told that an unidentified plane was heading to 
Washington, D.C., Cheney ordered the military to shoot it down.18   Cheney’s chief of staff, Lewis 
“Scooter” Libby, later said Cheney responded to that historic request for authority “’in about the time it 
takes for a batter to decide to swing.’”19  
Bush and Cheney later insisted that Cheney was simply relaying instructions Bush had given him.  
That seems a dubious claim.   The 9/11 Commission placed the initial request for authority and the 
Cheney directive at between 10:10 and 10:15 a.m20 so Bush would have had to give Cheney such 
instructions before that time.  Yet not one of a dozen set of records, official and unofficial, reflected a 
Bush-Cheney conversation during the time period between when the threat became known and the 
order was given.21   Lynne Cheney and Scooter Libby were with Cheney and taking notes, but neither 
mentioned such a call in which Bush authorized a shoot-down order before Cheney gave it.22  Having not 
heard any prior discussion between Bush and Cheney, Deputy White House Chief of Staff Joshua Bolten, 
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 Gellman, supra note 9 at 120-22; Philip Shenon, The Commission: The Uncensored History of the 9/11 
Investigation 265-66 (2008).  See also The 9/11 Commission Report, supra note 19 at 41. 
22
 9/11 Commission Report, supra note 19 at 41;   Shenon, supra note 21 at 266. 
who was with Cheney, asked Cheney to confirm the initial order with Bush.23  Instead of simply telling 
Bolten that Bush had already given the instruction, Cheney called Bush at 10:18 a.m.24   Gellman notes 
that Bush did not tell anyone of having issued such an order until 10:20 a.m. when he hung up after a 
two minute conversation with Cheney.  Yet Cheney had given the shoot down order five to ten minutes 
earlier.25  The staff of the 9/11 Commission did not believe the account Bush and Cheney gave and that 
skepticism was apparent in its draft report which the White House reviewed.26  Cheney placed an irate 
call to Commission chair Tom Kean to demand the section be rewritten to accord with the Bush-Cheney 
account but apparently no substantive change was made.27 
Cheney’s shootdown action may have been understandable under the bizarre circumstances of 
that awful day but neither the Constitution nor any statutory source authorized him to issue such a 
military order.  For present purposes, however, Cheney’s issuance of the order confirms the 
extraordinary power which he felt free to exercise even before the Bush administration began to devise 
its response to the war on terror.  Cheney’s standing to exercise such power was necessarily anchored in 
foundations which preceded the al Qaeda attack. 
B. Sources of Cheney’s Power 
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Just as Cheney’s stature as of September 11, 2001 was not dependent on the war on terror, it 
also was not explained simply by the institutionalization of the vice presidency which preceded the Bush 
administration.  Cheney, of course, benefitted from the Mondale resources and the increased 
expectations of vice-presidential involvement which had developed during the tenures of Vice 
Presidents Mondale, Bush, Quayle and Gore.  Those factors guaranteed him a level of influence and 
invested him with operational assets such as his proximity and access to Bush and his closest White 
House advisers and his access to information and expertise.  Yet other modern vice presidents had 
essentially those same assets yet lacked Cheney’s pre 9/11 influence.  As such, their existence could not 
account for the unprecedented level of power he achieved, a development which had other causes.   
Other factors explained Cheney’s unique position. 
1) Relationship with Bush 
First, Cheney’s influence stemmed from his  relationship with Bush.  Other vice presidents had 
been politically and personally compatible with the Presidents they served  but the Bush-Cheney 
relationship was unique in a critical way.   Unlike their recent predecessors, Bush and Cheney had a close  
relationship which preexisted their inauguration.  Cheney had  served Bush’s father as Secretary of 
Defense and  had consulted with Bush regarding Bush’s presidential campaign.   He was often present 
for high level briefings of Bush up to and during the 2000 presidential campaign and Bush came away 
from those meetings impressed with Cheney’s contributions and with the  respect he commanded from 
the other participants.28  Cheney  served as a public supporter whose presence lent gravitas and whose 
voice lent credibility to Bush’s effort.29   
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 James Mann Rise of the Vulcans: The History of Bush’s War Cabinet 252 (2004). 
Bush and Cheney had also had occasion to work closely together, an experience which led Bush 
to value Cheney’s judgment and loyalty.  Although Cheney had declined Bush’s request that he chair his 
presidential campaign, a position Cheney thought inconsistent with his obligations as chief executive of 
Halliburton,  Cheney later agreed to direct his vice-presidential search.  For present purposes not much 
turns on whether Cheney opportunistically used that assignment to position himself for selection as 
some have suggested30 or whether Cheney accepted Bush’s repeated solicitations to join the ticket only 
as he came to see that he really did furnish Bush’s best option, as Bush and Cheney later claimed.  In any 
event, Bush and Cheney worked together in that undertaking in a relationship which in some respects 
foreshadowed their White House interaction.  Cheney ran the search process, controlled information 
about prospective candidates, and reported to Bush from time to time.  Bush was  drawn to Cheney by 
the latter’s lack of presidential, or even apparent vice-presidential, ambition, a disposition which Bush 
thought would foster Cheney’s loyalty to the president’s agenda.31   
Unlike his predecessors, Cheney did not have to first establish credibility with the president and 
his inner circle at the beginning of his term.   There was no need for him to proceed with diffidence to 
win the confidence of Bush or his closest advisers.  On the contrary, Cheney began his vice presidency 
with an established relationship with Bush and accordingly was able to assert himself in the early days of 
the administration when lasting patterns of conduct are often formed.  As will be seen below, this 
advantage had other implications which contributed to Cheney’s power. 
2) Bush’s Leadership Style 
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Second, Bush’s leadership style created the possibility of a powerful vice presidency in at least 
three different ways.  Bush’s leadership style depended upon delegating considerable operational 
authority to others.    Consistent with business models of leadership with which Bush was familiar,  he 
envisioned the president as a chairman of the board who depended upon a chief operating officer.  
Moreover, Bush was temperamentally disposed to focus on the big picture rather than immersing 
himself in the detail of issues. As Newsweek columnist Howard Fineman observed during the first 
months of the Bush administration, “It’s not just that the president doesn’t know all the details, he has 
no desire to learn all the details.”32   Bush’s aversion to detail meant that he needed someone he trusted 
who could and would master and distill the fine points of policy for him.  Finally, Bush focused largely on 
the political or outside dimensions of the job.  He enjoyed the public part of politics.  He made frequent 
public appearances which took him away from the White House.  This orientation created opportunity 
for someone to remain behind to work the internal levers of power at the White House.  Bush’s 
leadership style created a need, or space, for a powerful subordinate(s).  As will be suggested below, 
Cheney became the operating person for much of the government and the person who distilled 
information for Bush and framed options for his decision. 
Bush’s style contrasted with that of other recent presidents who engaged their vice presidents 
but exercised some restraint in delegating authority to them.  Carter, George H.W. Bush and Clinton 
were all heavily engaged in policy formulation and implementation on an ongoing basis with, in some 
cases, a tendency to micromanage aspects of their presidencies.  They gave their vice presidents 
missions, sometimes of great significance, but tended not to delegate general responsibility in central  
areas.  Mondale acted as a troubleshooter but preferred to avoid ongoing portfolios; Bush, Quayle and 
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Gore accepted, even welcomed, portfolios but those they received varied in importance and tended not 
to involve the most central issues.  Like George W. Bush, Reagan delegated important operational roles, 
but generally to his closest White House aides or to Cabinet members, not to the vice president, and 
generally in a manner which limited their autonomy. 
3) Cheney’s Resources 
Third, Cheney brought extraordinary resources to the vice presidency. Cheney had a diversity of 
high level experience that few, if any, could match. He had served as White House chief of staff, 
Republican minority whip in the House of Representatives, and Secretary of Defense.   This broad based 
resume gave him occasion to witness and understand how critical aspects of the government 
functioned.    Cheney knew how policy got made in the White House, on Capitol Hill and in the 
departments and he knew how new initiatives got stopped.  He was a master of working the system to 
achieve any of those outcomes.33 
 Cheney’s history of past service also gave him enormous credibility.  Cheney had a record  of 
success in a series of demanding positions.  Others were prepared to defer to Cheney because of his vast 
experience and their perceptions of his ability. 
Finally,   Cheney had a range of contacts in Washington, in the business community and 
overseas which enhanced his influence.    He had served in the Ford White House with Alan Greenspan, 
head of the Federal Reserve Board, and in Congress with Republican leaders like Senate majority leader 
Trent Lott, Speaker of the House of Representatives Denny Hastert, House minority leader Dick Armey 
and chairman of the House Committee on Ways and Means Bill Thomas, all of whom he counted as 
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friends.34  His service at the Pentagon and at Halliburton allowed him to establish relations with 
international figures.  Cheney did not simply have a comprehensive rolodex but a network of 
relationships with powerful figures.  
Cheney’s resources were formidable but more importantly, they meshed well with the needs of 
the Bush administration, thereby fortifying Cheney’s position.    Bush came to the presidency with less 
experience in national government or international matters than virtually any other president in the 20th 
century.       As James Mann put it, “[b]ecause Bush’s prior experience was so limited, he was obliged to 
rely to an extraordinary extent on his advisers for ideas and for information.”35  Bush recognized this gap 
in his resume.  He had told Cheney: “I don’t know what’s going to come on my desk, but I’m going to 
need somebody who’s seen things before, who can give me  advice to make good decisions.” 36 To be 
sure, Bush was close, perhaps closer with some of the Texans who accompanied him to Washington—
Karen Hughes, Alberto Gonzalez, Karl Rove.    And others, like Colin Powell and Donald Rumsfeld, also 
had high level experience and credibility.  But Cheney had advantages over both sets of people.  Unlike 
Cheney, the Texans were Washington neophytes;  they lacked his knowledge of the workings of the 
national government and the issues it faced and his relationships.    And Cheney was far closer to Bush 
than were Powell or Rumsfeld, both personally and physically, and the vice-presidential resources 
accentuated his margin. 
  Cheney also brought a skill set which Bush badly needed.  As someone who felt most 
comfortable dealing in generalities, Bush needed someone to immerse himself in the detail of policy and 
digest it for him.  Cheney filled that void.  He was essentially a policy wonk who was perfectly content to 
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digest huge amounts of briefing papers and distill them for Bush.  Cheney, for instance, had a full 
intelligence briefing early each morning which served as a dry run for the later presidential briefing.  
Thus prepared, Cheney would later join Bush at the president’s session at which Cheney would ask 
questions to make sure Bush was briefed in areas Cheney thought important.37  Whereas Bush was 
essentially an outside man who was best suited for the public, political and symbolic aspects of the job, 
Cheney was an insider, happy to spend his time in policy meetings, shaping and implementing decisions 
about governing.38     
4) Cheney’s Role in the 2000-2001 Transition 
Fourth,   Cheney’s unique role in the 2000-2001 presidential transition constituted a unique 
source of power.  The contest regarding   Florida’s electoral votes extended the presidential campaign 
for another month, thereby distracting Bush’s attention from the transition and truncating the period in 
which Bush focused on establishing a government.  Bush charged Cheney with directing the transition.  
Whereas vice presidents like Mondale and Gore had been at the table during prior transitions when 
personnel decisions were made, Cheney assumed overall responsibility for the transition,   an 
unprecedented assignment for a vice president-elect.39     
Cheney set up a transition operation in Washington and placed loyalists like David Gribbin,  
David  Addington, and his daughter,  Liz,   in key positions.   Cheney played the  leading role in 
formulating the short lists for high level positions and  was one of three persons with Bush when he 
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made personnel decisions, the others being Andrew Card and Clay Johnson.40  Cheney  positioned close 
associates like Donald Rumsfeld in  positions like Secretary of Defense and  derailed the prospects of 
others.  Many of those Bush appointed to Cabinet level positions-- in addition to Rumsfeld,   Paul O’Neill 
at Treasury and Spencer Abraham at the Department of Energy-- had long standing relationships with 
Cheney. 41 Cheney placed many former associates in important positions in the departments and the 
White House.  For instance, Paul Wolfowitz, his former deputy at the Pentagon, got the second job 
under Rumsfeld.  Cheney supported Mitch Daniels to be director of OMB and placed Sean O’Keefe, an 
alumnus of the Cheney Pentagon, as Daniels’ deputy.42     Stephen Hadley  and Zalmay Khalilzad, both 
also from the Cheney Pentagon, became deputy National security  adviser and oversaw Iraq and 
Afghanistan policy at the NSC respectively .  Cheney’s former congressional aide, Paul Hoffman, landed a 
spot as deputy assistant at the interior department.43  This list is suugestive but by no means exhaustive. 
 Cheney’s central role in the transition gave him three critical assets which greatly enhanced his 
ability to influence policy.  He was able to place allies throughout the government, thereby assuring that 
the executive branch would be filled with people whose views were similar to his and who were 
favorably disposed to him.  Rumsfeld (and Wolfowitz’s) presence at the Pentagon meant that Cheney 
had a likely ally on most major national security issues.  It meant that State and Defense would often be 
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at loggerheads which meant issues had to be resolved at the White House where Cheney could 
influence Bush.44  Moreover, Cheney benefitted from the recognition that many Bush appointees had 
that they owed their positions in large part to him.  Accordingly, they were sympathetic to him and 
predisposed to respond favorably to his requests.  Finally, the transition assignment sent a powerful 
signal to others, inside and outside of the Bush government, of Cheney’s significance.  The 
unprecedented assignment confirmed that Bush trusted Cheney and suggested patterns of operation for 
the administration. 
5) Staffing Arrangements 
 Fifth, Cheney’s staffing arrangements conferred additional advantages.  Cheney had a large  
staff whose personnel was concentrated in critical areas.  Whereas prior vice presidents hired fewer 
than a handful of national security advisers, Cheney appointed a separate team which enhanced his 
independent capability regarding foreign policy.45     Cheney’s staff was also fully integrated into White 
House operations.46  Two of Cheney’s top aides, his chief of staff and national security adviser, Lewis 
“Scooter”  Libby and political adviser Mary Matalin also were members of Bush’s senior staff.  As such, 
they attended the daily meeting of the White House senior staff.    Libby, along with Rice’s deputy, 
Stephen Hadley, was the only non-principal who attended NSC and principals meetings and Libby was 
also included at deputies meetings.  Cheney’s domestic staffers worked alongside Bush’s personnel.  
Thus, Cheney was kept abreast of, and was able to influence, decisions at multiple levels.   
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Moreover,   Cheney’s associates had far more experience in Washington and with national 
politics than did many of Bush’s top aides.  For instance,   David Addington, Cheney’s counsel, worked 
closely with Gonzales.  He was invariably involved when the White House considered important legal 
issues.47 Addington’s Washington experience, superior knowledge on substantive issues and forceful 
personality enabled him to influence legal policy in the White House.  As one colleague explained: 
“David Addington is an extremely intelligent, extremely forceful individual who has very firmly held 
views and very well-grounded views on a lot of issues relating to the presidency, the vice presidency, the 
executive branch and separation of powers. As events played out through the administration, those 
views, coupled with David's very forceful and persuasive personality, ended up having a significant 
impact on the way things played out.”48  Finally, the influence of Libby, Addington and other Cheney 
aides was enhanced by Cheney’s clout and the perception that they spoke for him.49 
6) Lack of Presidential Ambitions 
  Cheney’s lack of presidential ambitions has often been described as contributing to his influence 
within the administration.  Whereas Cheney’s recent predecessors had all anticipated a subsequent 
run for the presidency-- indeed part of the allure of the vice presidency to them was its value as a 
political springboard
50
--  Cheney  trumpeted his lack of future presidential ambitions.  President Bush 
and others cited this unusual characteristic as freeing Cheney from divided loyalties and fortifying his 
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commitment to the objectives of the Bush administration.  During the 2004 vice-presidential debate, 
Cheney said that “from the perspective of the nation” his relationship had “worked in part because I made 
it clear that I don't have any further political aspirations myself. And I think that's been an advantage.  I 
think it allows the president to know that my only agenda is his agenda. I'm not worried about what some 
precinct committeemen in Iowa were thinking of me with respect to the next round of caucuses of 
2008.”
51
   Bush and other White House personnel attached significance to this factor and accordingly it  
probably merits some weight.  
 It seems likely, however, that Cheney’s lack of ambition reinforced his power in another way 
which has received less emphasis.  Since Cheney was not interested in seeking a presidential term of his 
own he had less reason to spend time accepting engagements to curry favor with those who might help 
in a future campaign.  He was free to devote his time to the administration’s current projects rather 
than to his own future.  As such, he was able to be in the White House or in Washington more 
frequently and to devote his time and energy to shaping present policy,  not future leadership.52 
7) Compounded Authority 
Finally, Cheney’s authority compounded itself.  His relationship with Bush made others interested in 
dealing with him which enhanced his ability to get things done.  His ability to work with congressional 
leaders or figures like Greenspan made him more valuable to others in the administration (which 
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strengthened his hand internally).   Bush’s operational style created vacuums which Cheney and his staff 
could fill. 
III. Cheney and Executive Power: Pre 9/11 
A. The Roots of Cheney’s Commitment to Presidentialism 
 Cheney’s conviction that executive power needed to be strengthened predated the war on 
terror by decades.  Its roots traced to his service as  a relatively obscure aide in the Nixon executive 
branch and as deputy chief of staff and chief of staff to President Ford in the mid 1970s, a period during 
which Congress increasingly sought to assert its powers in response to the perceived excesses of an 
imperial presidency.   In early 2002, Cheney said:  “But in 34 years, I have repeatedly seen an erosion of 
the powers and the ability of the president of the United States to do his job. We saw it in the War 
Powers Act. We saw it in the Budget Anti-Impoundment Act. We've seen it in cases like this before, 
where it's demanded that presidents cough up and compromise on important principles.”53  Cheney 
opposed these initiatives of an invigorated Congress.  He saw the presidency which  emerged in the mid 
1970s as a mere shadow of the robust institution the Constitution, as he interpreted it,  envisioned.   
 For decades before September 11, 2001, Cheney had advocated the restoration of executive 
power.  He encouraged friends in the Reagan administration to make that a central theme it would 
pursue.54 Later, as the senior Republican on the House of Representatives Select Committee to 
investigate the Iran-Contra controversy, he joined the Minority Report which rejected the widespread 
view that the Reagan executive branch had violated the law during the Iran-Contra affair.  The Minority 
                                                           
53
 Interview with Vice President Cheney, This Week With George Stephanopoulos, (ABC television broadcast Jan. 
27, 2002). 
54
 Gellman, supra note 9, at 101; “11/19 Cheney” Notes of James A. Baker, http://media.washingtonpost.com/wp-
srv/politics/interactives/cheney/docs/baker_notes.pdf 
Report included a lengthy discussion of a constitutional theory which assigned broad powers to the 
presidency.  The Report defended many of President Reagan’s actions as “constitutionally protected 
exercises of inherent Presidential powers” and contended that many of the Congressional statutes 
which were allegedly violated were unconstitutional usurpations of presidential power.55  The Minority 
Report argued that the Constitution gave the president broad powers in foreign affairs independent of 
Congress, a conclusion it based on the intent of the framers and ongoing practice.56  Congressional 
action to limit the president in foreign policy “should be reviewed with a considerable degree of 
skepticism” and struck down if they interfered with core presidential functions.  Moreover, “doubtful 
cases should be decided in favor of the President.”57   The Minority Report stated: “The executive 
branch’s functions are the ones most closely related to the need  for secrecy, efficiency, dispatch and 
the acceptance by one person, the President, of political responsibility for the result.  This basic 
framework must be preserved if the country is to have an effective foreign policy in the future.”58 Nearly 
two decades later, in 2005, he directed reporters  to that “obscure text” which he said was “very good in 
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information.  Id. at 583-584. 
laying out a robust view of the President’s prerogatives with respect to the conduct of especially foreign 
policy and national security matters.”59 
Cheney’s endorsement of the Minority Report was not simply an exercise in partisan politics and 
it certainly did not reflect Cheney’s institutional interest as a leader of Congress.  Rather, the Minority 
Report  reflected Cheney’s deeply held convictions regarding separation of powers, a commitment he 
acted upon on other occasions during the Reagan years.60  Writing in early, 1989,  as a member of the 
House Republican leadership and before he was nominated to be Secretary of Defense, Cheney argued 
that “in recent years, in a wide range of disagreements with the president, Congress has used policy 
levers that go well beyond those the Constitution intended for the legislative branch.”  In assuming 
powers not intended for it, Congress not only encroached on the President’s domain but also effectively 
made the federal government incapable of exercising some of its power.  Cheney argued that the 
framers  expected some nations would seek to undermine American interests; accordingly “the 
Constitution allowed a much greater scope for executive power in foreign than in domestic policy.”  If 
anything, modern conditions suggested allowing greater leeway to the  President in security matters.  
“Technology has shrunk the globe, making the need for quick response and predictability of purpose 
that much more important.”61    
                                                           
59
 Richard B. Cheney, Vice President’s Remarks to the Traveling Press, Air Force Two en route Muscat, Oman, (Dec. 
20, 2005), http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2005/12/20051220-9.html. 
60
 See generally,  Charlie Savage, Takeover: The Return of the Imperial Presidency and the Subversion of American 
Democracy 50-52 (2007). 
61
 Richard B.  Cheney, Congressional Overreaching in Foreign Policy, in s) Foreign Policy and the Constitution 
(Robert A. Goldwin and Robert A. Licht eds.  1990).  Cheney complained of three specific practices—Congressional  
diplomacy (either by legislating instructions or by members engaging in back-channel negotiations with foreign 
leaders), requirements that the President notify Congress within 48 hours of covert activity, and the War Powers 
resolution. 
 As Secretary of Defense during the administration of George H.W. Bush, Cheney acted based  
upon his expansive views of presidential power.   Cheney had long believed that the President could 
commit troops to war as commander in chief without congressional authorization.  He  opposed the 
decision of President George H.W. Bush to seek congressional authorization for the Persian Gulf War;62  
Cheney would not have been deterred if  Congress refused to authorize the use of force. “If we'd lost 
the vote in Congress, I would certainly have recommended to the President we go forward anyway.”63 
B. Presidential Power and the Bush Administration: Pre 9/11 
Cheney’s commitment to asserting executive power became evident early in the Bush 
administration.  At the outset of the Bush Administration, Cheney instructed his legal counsel, David 
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Addington, to work to restore presidential power.64  For Cheney, the expansion of presidential power 
was not simply a means but an ultimate objective informed by an ideological commitment.  Cheney 
persuaded Bush to embrace enhancing presidential power as an administration priority.  Bush and 
Cheney “always made clear that a central administration priority was to maintain and expand the 
President’s formal legal power,” Jack Goldsmith wrote.65 Bush’s counsel, Alberto Gonzales, instructed his 
staff during its initial meeting of Bush’s resolve to strengthen the presidency.66  This commitment 
animated the work of the Bush administration and, accordingly, the argument that an alternative course 
would erode presidential power was a trump card which would usually prevail.  
Cheney operated based on these views during the early months of the Bush administration  
before 9/11 transformed its focus . In late January, 2001 Bush announced that Cheney would lead a high 
level task force to make recommendations for a comprehensive energy strategy.67   Cheney constructed 
and conducted his energy task force to escape the accountability requirements of the Federal Advisory 
Committee Act (FACA) by limiting its membership to governmental officials.68  When two ranking 
Democrats on relevant committees of the House of Representatives, John Dingell and Henry Waxman, 
and then the General Accounting Office, sought information regarding the composition and operation of 
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the Cheney task force, 69  Addington replied that FACA did not apply since all members and employees 
of Cheney’s task force were officers or employees of the federal government.70  Cheney later made 
broader claims to exempt his office from the scrutiny of the GAO.    He told one interviewer that the 
GAO lacked jurisdiction over him because “I'm the constitutional officer provided for in the Constitution 
…[a]nd the General Accounting Office has authority over statutory agencies, but not over constitutional 
officers” and “ it's important here to protect the ability of the President and the Vice President to get 
unvarnished advice from any source we want.”71  The stakes escalated as Cheney wrote the House of 
Representatives on August 2, 2001 that the GAO had exceeded its “lawful authority” and that its actions 
“would unconstitutionally interfere with the functioning of the Executive Branch.”72  The GAO denied 
that contention four days later, characterizing its requests as relating to factual and nonprivileged 
materials and stated that it had unsuccessfully attempted to speak with Cheney to try to resolve the 
dispute.73  Later that month, Walker submitted a report to Congress, a rare event,   Solicitor General 
                                                           
69
 Letter, U.S. Representatives JohnDingell and Henry Waxman to Andrew Lundquist, NEPDG Executive Director, 
(Apr. 19, 2001) http://oversight.house.gov/documents/20040831095838-21952.pdf; Letter, Dingell and Waxman 
to David Walker, Comptroller General GAO, (Apr. 19, 2001) available at 
http://oversight.house.gov/documents/20040831095928-35054.pdf 
70
 Letter from David Addington, Legal Counsel to Vice President Cheney to U.S. Representatives Billy Tauzin, John 
Dingell, Dan Burton, and Henry Waxman, (May 4, 2001) available at  
http://oversight.house.gov/documents/20040831095650-29059.pdf 
71
 Interview by Campbell Brown, Weekend Today, with Vice President Richard B. Cheney( NBC television broadcast  
Jan. 28, 2002) available at  http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=85612&st=cheney&st1=health 
72
 Letter from Vice President Richard B. Cheney to U.S. House of Representatives (Aug. 2, 2001), available at 
http://oversight.house.gov/documents/20040830233716-42929.pdf 
73
 GAO Statement Concerning NEPDG (Aug. 6, 2001) available at  
http://oversight.house.gov/documents/20040830233320-50377.pdf 
Theodore Olson signaled the interest of Bush and Cheney in the case by personally attending an 
argument at the district court, something he rarely did.74 
Some of Bush’s closest aides favored accommodating the congressional requests so as not to 
irritate members whose support would be needed to advance administration priorities.75   They worried 
about the political costs of Cheney’s position which “created an early impression of an administration 
prone to secrecy and reinforced the image of the Bush White House as in thrall to corporate interests.”76  
Cheney, however, embraced the controversy as an opportunity to establish new constitutional 
principles regarding more expansive presidential power.  When Cheney’s energy aide urged the Vice 
President to disclose records to demonstrate the validity of the Task Force’s process, Cheney reportedly 
replied, “Don’t ever suggest that to me again.”77  After David Gergen, Cheney’s former colleague in the 
Nixon and Ford White House, argued on CNN that Cheney should reveal the names of those with whom 
his Task Force had met, Cheney called Gergen “and he really wanted to talk about, ‘Don't you remember 
what we went through back in the '70s and how important it is for the executive to have the full power 
of the Constitution and how hampered we were back then?’” The conversation convinced Gergen that 
Cheney “really cares about this. It's deep in his being. It's fundamental to who he is and his perception of 
how the presidency should operate in conjunction with the Congress. He's a very, very strong believer 
that the presidency has been cut down too far.”78  Barton Gellman wrote, “[f]or Cheney, this was the 
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I took an oath …when I was sworn in to support and defend the Constitution of the 
United States. You have an obligation, I believe, in these offices to defend the office 
against the unlawful or unconstitutional or unreasonable encroachment by the other 
branches of government.  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
House and Constitutional rights and obligations and duties of the presidency, and protecting those. And this is a 
case where he firmly believes -- believes to the point where, when he talks about it, his eyes get a little bluer -- 
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The way the Constitution is set up specifically provides for separation of powers. And to 
create a precedent where future vice presidents, for example, would be in a situation 
where anytime they meet with somebody, they have to call Henry Waxman and tell them 
who they met with, what the subject was that was discussed, giving him notes of the 
meetings that were taken -- now, the Congressman does not have the constitutional right 
to insist that the President or the Vice President provide him with that information, any 
more than I can demand of the Congressman, look, you've got to tell me everybody you 
talked to before you cast that vote. That's silly. That's not the way the government works.  
Following an Oval Office session, Bush embraced Cheney’s approach regarding the operation of 
Cheney’s task force.83  The effort of the General Accounting Office to obtain records of Cheney’s energy 
task force jeopardized the ability of the President and Vice President “to get good, sound opinions.”   
Bush viewed the GAO “like the Vice President does” as “an encroachment on the executive branch’s 
ability to conduct business.”84  Cheney’s Chief of Staff Lewis Scooter Libby said that Cheney “firmly 
believes -- believes to the point where, when he talks about it, his eyes get a little bluer -- that for the 
presidency to operate properly, it needs to be able to have confidential communications.”85 
 Cheney’s effort to avoid disclosure regarding information of the energy task force reflected  his 
and  Bush’s deep commitment to expanding executive power well before 9/11.  The effort brought clear 
political costs and relatively small short-term gains since much of the information was disclosed in 
litigation against other governmental agencies.  Moreover, as Bruce Montgomery points out, Cheney 
could have short-circuited the dispute by simply certifying that disclosure would impair the conduct of 
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government.  Instead, Cheney invited the fight as a means to curtail Congress’ oversight of the executive 
branch.86 
The dispute regarding the energy task force provided the most visible, but not the exclusive, 
front in Cheney’s battle to expand presidential power prior to September 11, 2001.  Cheney also 
instructed Addington to review all legislation and to prepare signing statements addressing any 
perceived intrusions into presidential power.  Addington largely drove the Bush administration’s 
extensive and unprecedented use of signing statements, an effort which preceded 9/11 and went 
beyond areas related to national security.87 
IV. Cheney and Executive Power: The Influence of 9/11 
Prior to September 11, 2001, Cheney had established himself as history’s most powerful Vice 
President and as a proponent of an expansive view of presidential power.   The events of 9/11 provided 
the impetus for a significant aggrandizement of the power of the Vice Presidency, or more precisely, of 
one Vice President, and of the presidency more generally.   
The 9/11 attack introduced a new climate which favored broad assertions of presidential 
powers.  Five days later Cheney said on Meet the Press that “things have changed since last Tuesday.  
The world has shifted in some respects.”88  The attack on the homeland moved the discussion to an area 
where historically presidential prerogatives have been viewed most expansively and introduced a 
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context which tempered normal patterns of scrutiny of executive conduct.   The nation rallied around 
Bush; his, and Cheney’s, approval ratings reached their highest marks.89   
The events of September 11, 2001 introduced three dynamics which enhanced Cheney’s role.  
First, crisis invariably draws decision-making into the White House and tends to empower those who, by 
virtue of personal relationship and physical proximity, are close to the President.  Second, the events 
also brought to the forefront a set of issues in which Cheney’s expertise and credibility enhanced his 
role.  Third, the events of 9/11 frightened America and its leaders.  New feelings of vulnerability 
increased the calls for, and the receptivity to, more intrusive security measures.  Those, like Cheney, 
who had or were perceived to have, access to intelligence found that others were less willing to 
challenge their arguments. 
Cheney summoned his counsel, David Addington, to the White House bunker on September 11, 
2001   and asked him what additional power the President would need to prosecute the war against 
terror.   Addington, in consultation with Timothy Flanigan, associate White House Counsel, and John Yoo  
of the Office of Legal Counsel,  began to draw up sweeping grants of power.  In the aftermath of 9/11, 
understandably, administration lawyers engaged in an effort “to lay out for the president every single 
tool in his toolbox” by collecting statutory powers and interpreting constitutional grants.90  During his 
September 16, 2001 Meet the Press interview, Cheney famously said that henceforth America would 
“also have to work, though, sort of the dark side, if you will. We've got to spend time in the shadows in 
the intelligence world. A lot of what needs to be done here will have to be done quietly, without any 
discussion, using sources and methods that are available to our intelligence agencies, if we're going to 
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be successful. That's the world these folks operate in, and so it's going to be vital for us to use any 
means at our disposal, basically, to achieve our objective.”91   
In a number of areas in the aftermath of the al Qaeda attack, Cheney’s office spearheaded the 
development of policies  based upon expansive views of presidential power.   Cheney, Addington and 
others in his  office made broad claims based on the President’s Commander-in-Chief power which they 
viewed as a trump card over legal restraints which statutes or treaties imposed.  A few brief case studies 
put these claims in context and provide some indication of the manner in which Cheney’s office 
operated.   
A) Domestic Surveillance 
Consistent with the supervisory role which Bush had assigned Cheney regarding intelligence matters 
during the early days of the administration,  Cheney met with CIA director George Tenet and Michael 
Hayden of the NSA in the aftermath of 9/11 to devise an expanded surveillance program.   Working with 
Libby and Addington, they fashioned a  program for  surveillance of domestic, as well as international, 
targets  without a showing of probable cause or a judicially authorized warrant.  Advocates justified the 
program, which far exceeded the boundaries which the FISA statute (which Cheney’s office thought 
intruded on the President’s constitutional power) and the Search and Seizure Clause of the Constitution 
imposed,  based on expansive readings of  the President’s constitutional Commander-in-Chief power.    
The program was Cheney’s “brainchild” and he was instrumental in putting it into effect. 92 Cheney 
presented the proposal to Bush along with a draft order on October 4, 2001 and the President signed it 
that day.   
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By design, the program was intended to avoid scrutiny by the other branches of government.  
Cheney admonished his colleagues to share little about the program with Congress.93  Gellman wrote 
that “[t]he new legal framework was meant to be invisible, unreviewable—its very existence unknown 
by legislative or judicial actors who might push back.” 94  Beginning on October 25, 2001, Cheney, not 
Bush, typically conducted briefings of a small group of congressional leaders regarding the domestic 
surveillance program.  Yet these briefings provided limited oversight.   Few Congressional leaders were 
briefed and they were sworn to secrecy and accordingly were unable to share the information provided 
them even with staff, thereby minimizing their ability to access the necessary expertise to analyze it 
fully.95   At least one congressman, Senator Jay Rockefeller, expressed his discomfort with the program 
and procedure in a handwritten letter to Cheney,96  a complaint Cheney dismissed as a “CYA letter.”97 
 The program was formulated and implemented without input from many  stakeholders  in the 
executive branch.  Cheney and his associates deliberately excluded from knowledge about the program  
ranking justice department lawyers like Deputy Attorney General Larry Thompson,  John Bellinger, the 
attorney for the NSC and Fran Townsend, Bush’s advisor on counterterrorism.  Career lawyers at the 
Pentagon  who specialized in legal issues relating to NSA’s work were also denied information regarding 
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the program. Addington, for instance, refused to allow the Inspector General of the National Security 
Agency to read the Justice department’s legal analysis supporting the Terrorist Surveillance Program. 98 
Cheney later defended Bush’s domestic surveillance program as being “consistent with the 
President’s constitutional authority as Commander-in-Chief” and “consistent” with the Authorization of 
Military Force which Congress passed in September, 2001.  Moreover, Cheney repeatedly invoked the 
fact that the program was recertified every 30 to 45 days99 and that Congressional leaders had been 
briefed on the program.100  Cheney pointed to the attack on September 11 and the “possibility that 
same organization might try to attack the United States with deadlier weapon threats” as providing 
additional justification for the surveillance program which he claimed had “saved thousands of lives.”  
“When we were hit on 9/11, [President Bush] was granted the authority by the Congress to use all 
means necessary to take on the terrorists.  And that’s what we’ve done.”101   
 The efforts of Cheney’s office to protect the domestic surveillance program perhaps best 
illustrated the single-minded nature of its commitment to an expansive view of presidential power.  When 
Jack Goldsmith, a highly credentialed conservative academic, was named to head OLC in late 2003 
102
  he  
reviewed  a number of John Yoo’s opinions which had espoused expansive interpretations of executive 
power, including those regarding the domestic surveillance program.  Although Addington had closely 
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restricted those with knowledge of the program, Goldsmith, ultimately negotiated permission  to brief 
Deputy Attorney General James Comey regarding it.  A bitter debate developed in early 2004 regarding 
whether the Justice department would continue to certify the domestic surveillance program.    Comey 
persuaded Ashcroft  not to recertify the program unless it was changed but, hours later, Ashcroft was 
stricken with acute pancreatitis, the complications from which were almost fatal.  Comey became acting 
Attorney General as Ashcroft was  placed in intensive care  in early March, 2004.  When Goldsmith told 
Addington and Gonzales on March 6 that the Department of Justice would not recertify the program, 
Addington replied that “[i]f you rule that way, the blood of the hundred thousand people who die in the 
next attack will be on your hands.”  Three days later, Gonzales and Goldsmith met but did not resolve 
their differences.    
On March 9, 2004 Cheney met in Card’s office with leaders of the CIA, NSA and FBI.  Four hours 
later that group reconvened to meet with Comey, Goldsmith and Patrick  Philbin from OLC.   Comey 
advised that he would not recertify the domestic surveillance program which was otherwise due to 
expire.103  Cheney , supported by the intelligence personnel, argued that the program was critical and 
that its termination would impair national security.  Comey pointed out that Cheney’s defense went to 
the merit, not the legality of,  the program and contended that no good lawyer would advance the legal 
analysis which Bush and Cheney had  relied on, a rebuke to Addington who was among those lawyers 
who had done so.104 
The following day, March 10, 2004, Cheney convened a meeting of eight congressional leaders,   
the  leaders of the House and Senate  and of each body’s Intelligence committee, for a secret briefing 
regarding the domestic surveillance program.  Comey was specifically barred from the meeting.  For 
                                                           
103
 Answers to Written Questions to Former Deputy Attorney General James B. Comey Submitted by Senator 
Patrick Leahy, May 22, 2007 
104
 Gellman, supra note 9, at 295-296 
some legislators at the meeting, it was the first disclosure regarding the program.  Cheney advised them 
that  government lawyers had consistently certified the program but now, in Ashcroft’s untimely illness, 
Comey refused to do so.  Gonzales later testified that the administration had raised the possibility of  
legislation, a claim some legislators denied and one which seems dubious given Cheney’s view that  the 
President had constitutional authority and the impracticality of asking for legislation without 
undermining the secrecy of the program.105 
That night, Bush called Ashcroft (after his wife refused to accept a call from Card or Gonzales) 
and advised him that Card and Gonzales were en route to his hospital room.  They appeared at 
Ashcroft’s room in the intensive care unit to attempt to procure reauthorization from him.  Ashcroft told 
his visitors he was not in condition to make decisions and had relinguished power to Comey.  
Nonetheless, he reviewed the legal problems with the program and said  the White House had denied 
him the ability to obtain appropriate legal advice regarding the program by refusing to allow him to 
discuss it with certain advisors.106 
Bush signed a directive reauthorizing the program which Addington prepared with a signature 
line for White House counsel Gonzales instead of Ashcroft.  Card  told at least one of the congressional 
leaders that Gonzales had signed because Comey did not feel comfortable doing so in Ashcroft’s 
absence.   The following day, Bush met privately with Comey and then with FBI Director Robert S. 
Mueller III.  By then, White House officials had learned to expect massive resignations from the Justice 
department.  Bush protested that Comey had not raised his misgivings regarding the program until the 
last minute.  Since those doubts had been communicated for months, Bush’s claim, if credible, 
suggested that Cheney, Card and Gonzales had not  informed him of a fierce division in the 
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administration regarding the legality of a major program.  After meeting with Mueller, Bush agreed to 
modify the program to conform to guidelines the Justice department established.107 
Ultimately, the spectre of massive  resignations by political appointees in the Justice department 
gave Bush little choice but to accommodate Comey’s concerns.  Cheney’s premise, after all, was that the  
domestic surveillance program was sacrosanct but could only operate if secret.  The resignations would 
inevitably have exposed the program.  Moreover, the crisis arose less than eight months before the 
2004 presidential election.  Bush simply could not risk the political repercussions of a Justice department 
exodus which would have made the Saturday night massacre appear like a small wound. 
 The event, however, may have awakened Bush to a risk of allowing Cheney such autonomy.  
Cheney’s political blinders and his commitment to the importance, and in his view, legality,  of the 
domestic surveillance program led him to bring the administration to the brink of an election year 
debacle which would likely have made Bush a one term president.   
B) Military Commissions 
 Following 9/11, Gonzales established an interagency process  under the chairmanship of 
Ambassador Pierre Prosper, to consider how to handle those suspected of being foreign terrorists.  
Representatives of the State, Defense and Justice departments, of the military, NSC and White House 
counsel’s office participated but the vice president’s office did not attend those meetings.108  Some in 
the White House apparently became impatient with the interagency process and quietly initiated a 
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separate effort which Addington apparently drove and which excluded some of the interested agencies, 
like the State department and NSC. 109  
Addington played a leading  role in drafting a proposed presidential order establishing a system 
of Military Commissions under the jurisdiction of the Department of Defense to handle detainees.110  
The order was predicated on the President’s Commander-in-Chief power and the Authorization of the 
Use of Military Force joint resolution and responded to the national emergency created by al Qaeda’s 
attacks.111   Addington’s process was hardly transparent; Attorney General Ashcroft learned of the 
proposed order only because his subordinate, Yoo, had blessed the proposal which excluded America’s 
civil courts and the Justice department from the program.  Ashcroft had an unproductive meeting with 
Cheney to air his dissatisfaction with the arrangement.112  
Cheney presented the order to Bush during a private lunch on November 13, 2001 at which 
Bush approved it.  At the time, Bush was hosting meetings with Russian President Putin at the White 
House and the following days at his Crawford, Texas ranch.  Cheney directed that the order immediately 
be prepared in final form for Bush’s signature.   Addington finalized the order and it was presented for 
Bush’s signature that afternoon before he left for Crawford without notice to important stakeholders. 113 
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Even Cheney’s allies were stunned by the speed with which Cheney  obtained presidential approval.    
National security adviser Rice first learned of the order after Bush signed it.  Secretary of State Powell 
learned of it when and how many other Americans did-- when CNN announced it later that day.  “What 
the hell just happened?” Powell asked Prosper, the head of the interagency process considering the 
issue who was also in the dark.114 
In fact, the President’s Order presented significant constitutional issues.  It empowered the 
President to determine that a noncitizen should be tried by military commission without affording 
judicial review by writ of habeas corpus or appeal.  As James Pfiffner nicely put it, “the person would be 
indicted by a subordinate of the president based on evidence provided by subordinates of the president; 
the defendant would be tried by subordinates of the president; the defendant would be sentenced by 
subordinates of the president; and the only appeal would be to the president.”115 
Cheney defended the program before the U.S. Chamber of Commerce on November 14, 2001 .  
He pointed out that those subject to it were not American citizens and were persons “believed to have 
engaged in or be participating in terrorist attacks designed to kill Americans, or have provided sanctuary 
to those who are conducting terrorist operations against Americans.”  He argued that “somebody who 
comes into the United States of America illegally, who conducts a terrorist operation killing thousands of 
innocent Americans, men, women, and children” does not “deserve the same guarantees and 
safeguards that would be used for an American citizen going through the normal judicial process.” The 
program Bush had prescribed “guarantees that we'll have the kind of treatment of these individuals that 
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we believe they deserve.”116  Even assuming that Cheney was correct about the appropriate treatment 
for terrorists, the President’s Order, and Cheney’s defense of it, assumed the infallibility of the judgment 
that the President and his subordinates made regarding the culpability of those charged.  Suppose they 
were wrong? 
Cheney and Addington later resisted all suggestions that the administration seek congressional 
approval for proposed actions.  At a meeting to discuss the decision of the Supreme Court to hear Yaser 
Hamdi’s appeal, Goldsmith suggested asking Congress to approve the detention program.  “ ‘Why are 
you trying to give away the President’s power?’” Addington asked.  Addington believed that seeking 
congressional approval would imply that approval was needed and accordingly would diminish 
presidential power.
117
  Addington was prepared to risk an adverse Court decision rather than seeking 
congressional sanction.  Although the Supreme Court ruled Bush’s order illegal in important respects in a 
series of decisions,
118
 the Bush administration subsequently obtained legislation from Congress 
reinstating much of what it sought.
119
 
C) Holding Geneva Inapplicable 
Cheney’s office, along with Yoo, spearheaded a successful effort to persuade Bush to deny the 
protections of the Geneva Convention to members of al Qaeda or the Taliban.  During Cheney’s 
November 14, 2001 comments to the Chamber of Commerce, he had said that unlawful combatants       
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“ don't deserve to be treated as a prisoner of war.”120    Whether Cheney meant that cryptic statement 
to signal his view that Geneva’s protections of prisoners of war did not cover this population, his office 
clearly pushed that view within the administration.  Yoo drafted a memorandum denying that the 
Geneva Convention bound the United States, a position which the State department opposed.  Bush 
apparently accepted Yoo’s position on January 8, 2002 and, consistent with it, Rumsfeld  instructed the 
Joint Chiefs ten days later that the military need not treat al Qaeda or Taliban prisoners in accordance 
with the Geneva protections.   Since Bush had not convened a meeting of his principal advisers to 
discuss the issue, Powell thereafter obtained an audience with Bush on January 21, 2002  regarding the 
subject.  Working with allies in the Departments of Defense and Justice as well as with Flanigan at the 
White House, Addington prepared for Gonzales’ signature a memorandum of January 25, 2002  advising 
that the Geneva convention did not apply.  Before the NSC meeting which Bush called for January 28, 
2002 , the Gonzales-Addington memorandum was leaked to the Washington Times, a conservative 
newspaper, which quoted administration sources as saying Powell was caving to left wing pressure.121  
In early February, 2002  Cheney obtained Bush’s signature on an executive order which Addington had 
prepared denying protections of the Geneva Conventions to al-Qaeda detainees.122  
Cheney and his office remained heavily involved in programs for enhanced interrogation.  
Cheney participated in the decisions to use enhanced interrogation techniques, including 
waterboarding.  He pressed the Justice department to issue a memorandum approving forms of 
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torture.123 He briefed selected Congressmen and was viewed on the Hill as “ground zero” on the issue.  
“It was his office you dealt with at the end of the day,”124  Senator Lindsay Graham said Cheney 
defended those decisions as a “no-brainer”125 and Cheney justified them as  based on “sound” legal 
opinions to use “reasonable” techniques to “acquire good intelligence.”   The actions were consistent 
with the constitutional obligation of Bush and Cheney  “to protect against all enemies, foreign and 
domestic”; it would have been “unethical or immoral” not to do “everything we could in order to 
protect the nation” against a repeat of 9/11.126  Cheney lobbied unsuccessfully against the McCain 
Amendment banning torture during the latter part of 2005. When Bush signed the 2005 Detainee 
Treatment Act  which limited interrogation practices he issued a signing statement  which repeatedly 
invoked the president’s constitutional power to modify the provisions in the act.127 The signing 
statement seemed to reflect Addington’s hand and Cheney’s influence.128  
D) Conclusion 
  If anything, the events of 9/11 reinforced Cheney’s belief in a “strong, robust executive 
authority.”  In December, 2005 he acknowledged  that “especially in the day and age we live in, the 
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nature of the threats we face… the President of the United States needs to have his constitutional 
powers unimpaired, if you will, in terms of national security policy.”129 
Cheney’s views a month before leaving office were equally expansive.  In wartime, the 
President’s powers relative to the other branches were “very significant.”  Cheney said, the Commander 
in Chief power entailed not simply command of the military but   “collecting intelligence” which means 
“you're fully justified in setting up a terror surveillance program to be able to intercept the 
communications of people who are communicating with terrorists outside the United States.”  Moreover, 
Cheney thought the President had constitutional power to “have a robust interrogation program with 
respect to high-value detainees.” As a “general proposition,” Cheney thought that presidential action 
during wartime to protect the country was legal.
 130
 
V. Cheney and the Escape from Accountability 
After 9/11 Cheney pursued policies in the war on terror which were predicated on an expansive 
theory of presidential power.  Programs which Cheney advocated stretched conventional notions of 
executive power and contracted means of holding the executive accountable for its conduct.    Cheney 
and his office were integrally involved in creating and overseeing programs related to the war on terror 
and accordingly the expansion of presidential power also increased the Vice President’s power. 
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Yet Cheney’s enhanced vice-presidential role was not simply, or even primarily, a product of the  
war on terror.   On the contrary, Cheney used his enhanced vice-presidential role to push that expansive 
conception of presidential power.  Cheney’s extraordinary influence traced in substantial part to factors 
previously identified—his relationship with Bush, the opportunity to fill vacuums created by Bush’s 
leadership style, the resources Cheney brought to office and the value of those resources to the 
administration, Cheney’s role in the transition, Cheney’s staff, and his lack of presidential ambitions. 
                  Cheney’s exercise of unprecedented vice-presidential power was accompanied by an 
unprecedented absence of vice-presidential accountability.     Conventional forms of vice-presidential 
accountability, which had constrained Cheney’s recent predecessors, eroded during the Bush years and 
left Cheney, and the Bush administration, less subject to informal administrative and political checks 
which in the past had contributed to restraining governmental conduct and promoting deliberative 
decision-making.   The absence of these traditional checks during much of Cheney’s tenure enabled him 
to operate free from normal sources of accountability which restrained prior officials of the executive 
branch. 
In considering the demise of vice-presidential accountability during the Bush-Cheney years, it is 
important to recognize three attributes which give the Vice President a unique character compared to 
other presidential advisers and administration insiders.   First, a Vice President is not simply an adviser 
but the occupant of a constitutionally prescribed office who can claim a mandate traceable to the 
electorate.  To be sure, most Americans weigh most heavily the choice between competing presidential, 
not vice-presidential, candidates.  Nonetheless, the Vice President’s place on the ticket, role in the 
campaign and receipt of at least 270 electoral votes furnishes him or her with a legitimacy and status 
second only to the President.  “I’m not a staffer, I’m the vice president, a constitutional officer, elected 
same as he is, “131 Cheney told biographer Steven Hayes.  
In addition to his constitutional stature, the Vice President’s position is enhanced by the fact that 
he/she is the first presidential successor who stands the proverbial heartbeat away from the presidency.   
Unlike others, the Vice President may, at any minute become, as John Adams put it, “everything.”132  
That contingent significance commands deference. 
 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the Vice President cannot be dismissed during his/her four 
year term.  The Constitution gives the Vice President the same four year term it prescribes for the 
President.133  Bush could and did dismiss Powell, O’Neill, Rumsfeld, Card, Rove, and many others.  He  
could not remove Cheney.    
Historically these three attributes—the electoral connection, the successor possibility and tenure— 
have been both a blessing and a curse for the vice presidency.  To be sure, they enhanced the Vice 
Presidency and gave its officer a status other administration officials could not claim.  On the other 
hand, they also constituted part of the inherent vice-presidential baggage which inhibited Presidents 
from giving Vice Presidents meaningful responsibilities.    Even as President Carter and his successors 
gave, and their Vice Presidents accepted, significant assignments, they did so in a manner which was 
sensitive to the need to maintain the office as one which was accountable to the President and subject 
to other forms of informal constraint.   
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Those conventional modes of accountability largely disappeared during much of the Cheney terms.  
The discussion below outlines the erosion of various factors which had contributed to vice-presidential 
accountability.  
A) Absence of presidential supervision due to Bush’s Style of Leadership 
Not only did Bush’s leadership style afford Cheney the opportunity to play an important 
operational role but it also  helped make Cheney less accountable to presidential oversight than any vice 
president in history.  Two aspects of Bush’s leadership style fostered an unaccountable Vice 
Presidency—his habits and method of delegating power to the Vice President and his lack of intellectual 
engagement in problems of the Presidency.   
Bush was not the first modern president to delegate heavily to subordinates.   Ronald Reagan, 
focused on large concepts while leaving details and operations to others.  But Reagan’s delegation of 
power differed in critical respects from Bush’s approach.   Reagan had relied on a series of strong Chiefs 
of Staff to operate the executive branch and had imposed various checks on them. Unlike a Vice 
President, Reagan’s Chiefs of Staff served at the President’s pleasure, and three of the four (James 
Baker, Howard Baker, and Ken Duberstein) were enormously sensitive political operators who were 
scrupulous in their habits of deference to him and  served as honest brokers for policy.  (The imperious 
behavior of the fourth, Donald Regan, ultimately cost him that role).  James Baker, Reagan’s chief of 
staff during his first term, worked in tandem with long-term Reagan loyalists Ed Meese, Mike Deaver 
and William Clark.    Bush, however, delegated authority to a stronger Vice President who was not 
subject to effective internal checks until the latter part of Bush’s second term when Josh Bolten replaced 
Card as Chief of Staff.   
Moreover, Bush was less equipped than other Presidents to supervise his Vice President due to 
his lack of intellectual engagement in his work as President.  Unlike Carter, George H. W. Bush,  Clinton, 
and Obama, Bush did not immerse himself in policy.  Unlike Reagan, he had not developed and refined 
views on critical issues by writing and speaking on them for a long period of time.     
Some Bush advisers recognized this limitation in his leadership.  Scott McClellan wrote: “Bush is 
plenty smart enough to be president.  But as I’ve noted, his leadership style is based more on instinct 
than deep intellectual debate.  His intellectual curiosity tends to be centered on knowing what he needs 
in order to effectively articulate, advocate, and defend his policies.”134  Paul O’Neill thought Bush’s 
inexperience, especially compared to that of other Presidents under whom he had served, Ford and 
George H.W. Bush, accentuated the need for a functioning policy process.  He argued that the 
administration could not just move based on instinct or without hearing from those with policy 
expertise.   Nixon and Ford had both insisted that departments provide them with Brandeis Briefs on 
major issues, O’Neill pointed out, whereas Bush tended to receive input primarily from a small circle of 
political advisors.   
Yet Bush resisted detailed briefings; administration officials soon learned that their briefings, 
whether written or oral, must be succinct to hold the President’s attention.  Bush received relatively 
little information; that deficit, coupled with his penchant for intuitive decision-making, made him ill-
equipped to assess and challenge proposals presented to him.   
Bush structured government so that many important disputes never came to his attention.  
Bush became dependent on Cheney for the operation of, and for information regarding, major 
governmental portfolios.  Cheney, not Bush, met with congressional leaders regarding critical legislation.  
Cheney, not Bush, often dealt with other principals of the executive branch regarding a host of 
important matters including intelligence, national security policy, and budgetary matters.   Attorney 
General Ashcroft’s strong disagreement with the proposed order establishing military commissions was 
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voiced to Cheney, not to Bush.  Appeal of OMB budget decisions went to Cheney, not Bush.      Cheney 
guided  Bush through his daily intelligence briefing.  Bush gave the order to initiate the war in Iraq by 
targeting a home where Saddam Hussein was thought to be after excusing everyone from the Oval 
office except Cheney and receiving Cheney’s advice to attack.  “Powell noted silently that things didn’t 
really get decided until the president had met with Cheney alone,” Woodward wrote.135    
The episode involving the near mass exodus from the Justice Department in March, 2004 
illustrated the extent to which Cheney operated without presidential supervision. Bush was apparently 
unaware of the strong opposition in the Justice department to the warrantless domestic surveillance 
program  until senior governmental officials were in the process of preparing their letters of resignation.   
It was largely fortuitous that the mass resignations were narrowly averted at the eleventh hour.    Since 
Bush delegated important areas of responsibility to Cheney and depended on the Vice President for 
much of his information, Cheney was relatively free to act autonomously within the executive branch.       
Near the end of his term, Cheney said that the “most important thing that any vice president needs 
to know is to understand what it is that the president he works for wants him to do.  That really will 
determine everything in terms of the kind of meetings he attends, the policy issues he gets involved in, the 
kind of assistance or advice he is asked for by the president and others…But to the degree of influence 
you have, whether or not it’s a consequential vice presidency, if you will, is going to depend almost solely 
upon the President and what he wants."
136
   To a great extent, Cheney exercised power which Bush gave 
him and without accountability because Bush allowed it.  Bush (and the country) paid a huge price for 
that deference to the Vice President under the circumstances. 
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B).  Absence of Policy-Making Process 
Bush failed to establish or adhere to any regular policy-making process and that absence 
removed an important vehicle for holding Cheney accountable for the quality of his counsel.  The 
scholarly literature on presidential decision-making emphasizes the importance of a policy process 
which exposes the President to competing perspectives regarding policy alternatives.137  Such a process 
is critical to ensure that competing views are presented and subject to scrutiny.  Cheney dominated 
decision-making in critical areas in the Bush administration138 and he resisted the establishment of a 
policy-making process in the White House which would insure that presidential decisions followed a full 
airing of competing views.     Cheney’s positions prevailed often because those likely to articulate 
competing views were excluded from meetings or not given fair opportunity to present their objections.   
Some key administration figures recognized the problem posed by the absence of a policy-
making process early in the administration.  Beginning during the transition and repeatedly during the 
first years of the administration, Secretary of Treasury O’Neill spoke to his old friend Cheney frequently 
regarding the problem.  O’Neill expressed his concern that the White House establish a policy process in 
domestic and economic affairs which included honest brokers and  rigorous examination of competing 
proposals.  He encouraged Cheney to act to remedy the situation.  On each occasion, Cheney listened, 
characteristically noncommittal and never disagreeing with O’Neill’s points,139 and thanked him for his  
“’sharp insights.’”140   
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Belatedly, O’Neill concluded that the absence of such a process was not inadvertent but 
reflected Cheney’s preference and design.     O’Neill told Cheney that Bush was “caught in an echo 
chamber of his own making, cut off from everyone other than a circle around him that’s tiny and getting 
smaller and in concert on everything—a circle that conceals him from public view and keeps him away 
from the one thing he needs most: honest, disinterested perspectives about what’s real and what the 
hell he might do about it.  But then ‘I realized why Dick just nodded along when I said all this, over and 
over, and nothing ever changed…because this is the way Dick likes it.”141 
 The absence or perversion of process became more acute following 9/11.  Cheney deliberately 
excluded key stakeholders from the deliberations which led to the domestic surveillance program and  
the military commission order.  Cheney and his associates sought to insulate programs from review by 
excluding doubters and denying them access to information.  After 9/11 Cheney’s office sought to 
circumvent FISA “in secret based on flimsy legal opinions that they guarded closely so no one could 
question the legal basis for the operations.”142  Similarly, Bush decided to hold the Geneva Conventions 
inapplicable to alleged al Qaeda or Taliban detainees on January 8, 2002 before he heard from the State 
department.143 
Cheney not only played an important role in promulgating these and other programs, he and his 
office were instrumental in protecting them from scrutiny.   Rather, than welcoming discussion 
regarding important programs, Cheney’s office acted to chill reexamination of policies it supported.  
After Goldsmith questioned the legality of CIA interrogation tactics, Addington berated him in harsh 
language.    Addington’s proclivity for sarcastic exchanges impeded deliberation. 
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 In adopting this approach, Cheney’s office deviated by 180 degrees from the philosophy 
Mondale espoused in suggesting that the Vice President could serve as an important presidential 
adviser.  Mondale thought the “biggest single problem” of recent administrations had been the failure 
to expose the President “to independent analysis not conditioned by what it is thought he wants to hear 
or often what others want him to hear.”  Mondale promised to offer Carter “impartial advice” and to 
“help assure that you are not shielded from points of view that you should hear.”  Mondale pledged to 
“help maintain the free flow of ideas and information which is indispensable to a healthy and productive 
administration.”144  True to his pledge, Mondale worked to expose Carter to a wider range of advice.  He 
often did not speak at larger meetings Carter attended for fear that his expressions might deter others 
from expressing competing views. 
 Cheney’s approach was antithetical to that Mondale followed.   Cheney’s office did not simply 
avoid meaningful Congressional oversight.  It structured decision-making within the executive branch 
regarding key components of the war against terror in such a manner to avoid debate.  The aversion to 
process allowed Cheney’s office to advance dubious proposals without subjecting them to the gauntlet 
of discussion.  Cheney dominated the advising system, and his views carried the day, on important 
issues relating to the war on terror but the result was flawed decisions.145  
  C). Cheney’s Lack of Vice-Presidential Self-Restraint 
  Bush’s leadership style and indifference to process created vacuums which afforded Cheney the 
chance to exert historic influence.  Cheney seized, and exploited, those opportunities.   Cheney’s lack of 
self- restraint represented a third way in which conventional modes of accountability eroded.  Other vice 
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presidents had acted with considerable restraint in performing their functions.  Mondale, for instance, 
would not become involved with activities without first getting Carter’s permission.  When he did engage 
the bureaucracy, he was careful to pursue Carter’s objectives, not his own agenda.  By contrast, Cheney 
assumed an aggressive approach which manifested itself in a variety of settings. 
As an advisor, Cheney spent enormous amounts of time alone with Bush.  Because Vice 
Presidents are somewhat constrained from advising in larger meetings,
146
 Vice Presidents need private 
access to the President in order to perform their advising role.  When a President is as uninformed and as 
indifferent to process as was Bush that access can provide the Vice President the ability to influence 
policy without his views being subject to any meaningful review.  The great disparity in knowledge and 
information between Bush and Cheney gave Cheney opportunity to dominate policy without his views 
being subject to the scrutiny. 
Cheney also was able to use his stature to extract favorable responses from the bureaucracy.  
Cheney frequently traveled to Langley or other intelligence agencies for briefings or to review data.  
Some agents claimed they felt pushed to provide analysis tailored to Cheney’s policy preferences.
147
  
When the Inspector General of the CIA  issued a report suggesting that the CIA enhanced interrogation 
program was illegal, Cheney summoned him to his office.
148
 
Cheney also used his public platform as Vice President to force administration policy.   
McClellan noted Cheney’s “habit of being unable to stay on message.”  Cheney “simply could not contain 
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his deep-seated certitude, even arrogance” to Bush’s detriment.
149
  Cheney often made statements which 
went beyond available intelligence or beyond decisions Bush had made.  For instance, in December, 2001 
he cited a report, subsequently discounted, that the mastermind of the 9/11 attacks, had traveled to Iraq for 
meetings.  He claimed that Iraq had a “’robust set of programs’” to develop weapons of mass destruction, 
an assertion which McClellan said pushed “the envelope of credibility.”
150
   
In August, 2002 Cheney became impatient as Bush seemed inclined to seek a  United Nations 
resolution as a prelude to war and as Republican luminaries, like Henry Kissinger, James Baker and Brent 
Scowcroft,  raised doubts regarding the advisability of unilateral American military action.  Cheney told 
Bush he wanted to speak out on Iraq without telling Bush what he would say.  Cheney’s speech, to the 
Veterans of Foreign War convention, claimed that “there is no doubt that Saddam Hussein now has 
weapons of mass destruction. There is no doubt he is amassing them to use against our friends, against 
our allies, and against us.
151
  Accordingly, Cheney told the VFW it would be useless or even 
counterproductive for United Nations inspectors to return to Iraq.  “[A] person would be right to question 
any suggestion that we should just get inspectors back into Iraq, and then our worries will be over, 
Cheney said.” “Saddam has perfected the game of cheat and retreat, and is very skilled in the art of denial 
and deception. A return of inspectors would provide no assurance whatsoever of his compliance with 
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U.N. resolutions. On the contrary, there is a great danger that it would provide false comfort that Saddam 
was somehow ‘back in his box.’"
152
    
The very option Cheney derided was under active consideration.   Cheney’s remarks, Bob 
Woodward later wrote, “just short of a declaration of war, were widely interpreted as administration 
policy.” 
153
  The New York Times described Cheney’s speech as “the administration's most forceful and 
comprehensive rationale yet for attacking Iraq” and quoted administration officials as saying that 
Cheney’s comments reflected Bush’s thinking.
154
  Powell was upset at Cheney’s effort to hijack policy.
155
  
In this instance, Cheney’s ploy was not entirely successful.  Bush later called for a United Nations 
resolution predicated on sending inspectors back to Iraq. Yet Cheney’s willingness to stray publicly from 
administration policy illustrated one way in which he did not honor traditional notions of vice-presidential 
restraint. 
Cheney’s staff did not act with the circumspection characteristic of most vice-presidential staffs.    
In the aftermath of 9/11,   Addington dominated sessions among administration lawyers and conducted 
himself in a manner which inhibited discussion.   When John Bellinger arranged to meet with Gonzales 
to suggest that a CIA report suggested that the United States was committing war crimes by treating 
detainees in an inhumane manner at Guantanamo,  Addington showed up, dominated the conversation 
and insisted that there would be no review of Bush’s decision that all at Guantanamo were enemy 
combatants entitled to no process.  When  Goldsmith advised Gonzales and Addington that the Fourth 
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Geneva Conventions protected  terrorists in Iraq,  Addington  became angry and “barked”,”’The 
President has already decided that terrorists do not receive Geneva Convention protections….You 
cannot question his decision.”  Bush’s decision related to al Qaeda and Taliban terrorists under the Third 
Convention, a different question. 156  
More than two years later, after Matthew Waxman, a Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, 
convened a Pentagon meeting in which a number of military figures advocated a return to Geneva 
standards, he was summoned to a White House meeting with Libby and Addington.   They berated him 
for raising the issue (“What you’re doing …is an abomination!” Addington reportedly bellowed) and told 
him the issue was forever closed.157  When Goldsmith advised Gonzales and Addington that  the Justice 
Department could find no legal basis for an important counterterrorism program, Addington replied in 
“disgust” that “’[i]f you rule that way, the blood of the hundred thousand people  who die in the next 
attack will be on your hands.’”158 “’Why are you trying to give away the president’s power,’” he would  
respond to opposing views.159  Others were hesitant to differ with Addington; his aggressive and 
sarcastic replies made disagreeing unpleasant and Cheney’s implicit backing lent weight to Addington’s 
counsel.  Moreover, Cheney’s office, often through Addington, opposed promotions for those with 
whom they had disagreed.160 
D) Cheney’s Lack of Presidential Ambition 
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 Cheney’s lack of ambition to succeed Bush as president was, as Bush and Cheney suggested, 
significant but not primarily because it committed Cheney to follow Bush’s agenda as they claimed.  On 
the contrary, Cheney’s lack of presidential aspirations made him and/or the administration less 
accountable in at least three different respects.   
From an administrative standpoint, Cheney’s lack of political ambition made him freer to deviate 
from Bush’s policies than if he sought to succeed Bush.  The political ambition of conventional vice 
presidents provides them with added reason to advance the agenda of the Chief Executive.  They hope 
their loyalty will be reciprocated when it comes time to make their own run for the White House.  That 
motivation did not constrain Cheney.  Cheney’s lack of ambition for future political advance freed him to 
follow his, not Bush’s, agenda on occasions and to push policy in directions he preferred.161   In essence, 
Bush and Cheney had it backwards when they celebrated the virtues of Cheney’s lack of ambition as 
committing him to Bush’s agenda.  On the contrary, it liberated him from having to follow Bush’s lead.  
Not surprisingly, administration officials seemed to advance that argument less often during the second 
term than the first. 
Cheney’s lack of presidential ambition also made him less politically accountable.  Cheney had 
less reason than his predecessors to travel the country and meet with voters, especially during the 
second term.  He did not need to spend time doing the things aspiring presidents do such as meeting 
with a range of citizens, holding press conferences and media interviews or considering public opinion.   
Cheney had less reason than other vice presidents to avoid policies which were politically unpopular.   
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“Maybe you could say that his political antennae aren’t up as high as they would be if he were running 
for president himself,” Andrew Card said in 2006 in something of an understatement.162   
Not surprisingly, Cheney’s standing in public opinion polls cratered.  A  CBS News poll during the 
first months of 2006 found Cheney’s favorability rating to be 18%, a score which columnist Richard 
Morin found to be lower than O.J. Simpson’s standing after his trial for allegedly murdering his wife and 
another man, lower than Josef Stalin’s standing with Russians, and lower than Vice President Spiro 
Agnew’s ratings in his last days in office.163    Other poll results, though not quite so dismal, confirmed 
Cheney’s lack of popularity outside a small segment of the Republican base.164 
Finally, Cheney’s own lack of political ambitions made the Bush administration less 
democratically accountable during the second term than other recent administrations.   Prior vice 
presidents had sought to use the vice presidency as a springboard to a presidential race.  That 
continuing reality helped mitigate the antidemocratic impact of the Twenty second Amendment which 
imposed term limits on the president.  Even during the second term, the Vice Presidents’ ambitions for a 
“third term” gave the administration reason to weigh popular opinion in fashioning policy. 
That incentive was missing during Bush’s second term.  Cheney said in February, 2007 that “I'm 
not running for office. I'm not worrying about what the folks in Iowa are going to say in the caucuses in 
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January of next year. I'm there to do a job, and that's to call them as I seem, to help the president to the 
best of my ability be the best president he can to address the issues of the day. We have tough issues. It's a 
tough job. And his job is tougher than my job. If you worried about the polls, you'd be absolutely 
traumatized and unable to get anything done.”
165
   Cheney argued that his “guiding principle” had been to 
do what he “thought was necessary and essential for the country” not “to achieve the highest level of polls 
that we could during the course of this administration.”
166
   A March, 2008 exchange with Martha 
Raddatz of ABC News reflected Cheney’s aversion to public opinion.  When Raddatz observed that  
“[t]wo-thirds of Americans say [the war in Iraq is] not worth fighting, and they're looking at the value 
gain versus the cost in American lives, certainly, and Iraqi lives,” Cheney replied, “ So?”  “[Y]ou don't 
care what the American people think?” Raddatz inquired.  “ No, I think you cannot be blown off course 
by the fluctuations in the public opinion polls…” Cheney replied. 
167
 
There is, of course, something admirable about leaders who put their country’s well-being 
above their political careers.  Yet democracy does not allow leaders the luxury of responding with an 
indifferent “So?” when confronted with the fact that the public has rejected their central policy 
objectives.  Democracy is predicated in important part on a continuing relationship between leaders and 
citizens.  Policy is only sustainable if it commands public support; without it, other governmental figures 
are likely to resist it.  Moreover, the absence of public support may signal that leaders have failed to 
adequately defend policy or that the policy is inherently indefensible.  Cheney’s lack of political 
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ambition, coupled with his indifference to public opinion, excused him from the conventional, yet vital,  
political  activity of engaging in a continuing dialogue with the public.   
E) Absence of Media Engagement as a Constraint 
Cheney’s lack of presidential ambition contributed to his disengagement from media 
interactions.  Although interaction with the media furnishes one means of holding most political leaders 
accountable, Cheney spent relatively little time with the press. At times, he appeared on the Sunday talk 
shows or on the MacNeil-Lehrer program to serve as a public advocate for the war on Iraq or other 
administration programs.  But Cheney conducted few press conferences, generally on overseas trips, 
and his interviews occurred irregularly and were concentrated on Fox News and other conservative 
outlets.   
Initially, Cheney’s aversion to engaging the media might have reflected his desire not to 
overshadow Bush or a concern by Bush’s public relations personnel that frequent Cheney interviews 
would diminish Bush.168  Cheney’s appearance on Meet the Press on September 16, 2001, when Cheney 
discussed his dominating role on September 11, 2001 had that effect, especially when Cheney’s central 
role at the White House was juxtaposed with Bush’s absence from the White House as he moved around 
the country before returning in the evening.  Even if this consideration influenced early strategy, it is 
hard to believe it continued to be a factor as  the country become more accustomed to Bush as 
President. 
  Cheney claimed that he reduced his media accessibility to protect his role as presidential 
advisor.  “Cheney decided early in his vice presidency that his job would not include much time with 
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journalists,” his authorized biographer, Stephen Hayes wrote.169  Cheney called that practice “a 
deliberate decision on my part” which was designed to protect his credibility as an advisor.170  “But it's a 
very conscious decision my part that the job I've had as Vice President can best be done if I'm not out 
publicly commenting on all of these issues,” Cheney told Martha Raddatz. “The question you and your 
colleagues in the press always ask is, well, what did you advise the President; did you support that 
policy; did he do what you recommended? Those are questions I won't answer. My value to him is the 
fact that we can talk privately, I can tell him what I think. Sometimes he agrees, sometimes he disagrees. 
He doesn't always take my advice, by any means. But the contribution I make, and my value to him I 
think is greater because he knows and everybody else knows I'm not going to be in the front pages of 
the paper tomorrow talking about what I advised the President on a particular issue.”171 
That explanation seems suspect, to say the least.  The media does not often ask Vice Presidents 
to divulge the advice they gave the President and those who have reached the nation’s second job are 
generally pretty nimble in avoiding or recasting questions they prefer not to answer.  Most vice-
presidential interviews present occasions to explain presidential initiatives not to promote the Vice 
President at the expense of the Chief Executive.  Cheney could have spoken to the press without 
discussing the advice he gave the President. 
Cheney’s course reflected rather an aversion to the press.  This attitude was manifested on 
many occasions and in different ways.  For a while, Cheney barred New York Times reporters from his 
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plane.  His office pushed, unsuccessfully, to impose stricter criminal sanctions for government officials 
who made unauthorized disclosures.172  In the aftermath of the incident in which Cheney accidentally 
shot a fellow hunter Cheney avoided releasing the story for hours; when he did, it was given to a small, 
local newspaper rather than to a national outlet.  Surely Cheney and his associates could not have 
thought that the first instance in which a Vice President shot another person in more than 200 years was 
not news.   Cheney’s lack of presidential ambitions removed a reason to burnish his public image 
through media availability and freed him to follow his dispositions regarding media inaccessibility.  In so 
doing, he escaped one of the types of activities which have helped make past vice presidents 
accountable. 
F). Absence of Bureaucratic Restraint as a Form of Vice-Presidential Accountability 
Cheney was subject to fewer bureaucratic restraints than were other recent vice presidents.  On 
occasion other administration figures did push back against Cheney—Powell on Iran policy, Comey on 
domestic surveillance—but Cheney appears to have faced less internal resistance than most of his 
predecessors for much of the life of the Bush administration.  A number of the features already 
identified helped explain this  phenomena.  Bush’s leadership style made many in the administration 
reluctant to appeal Cheney’s decisions to him.  Thus, Ashcroft did not take his unhappiness with the 
military commission order to Bush nor did those who lost in the budget review process before Cheney’s 
committee ask Bush to intervene.173  Similarly, Bush’s aversion to process limited the opportunities for 
others to persuade Bush to follow their advice, not Cheney’s.  Cheney had unlimited access to Bush, 
others did not, and Bush was simply not interested in exposing himself to a range of sources of 
information and ideas. 
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In addition to these other factors, Cheney’s control of the transition allowed him to create a 
government in which he was less accountable than prior vice presidents.  His ability to place allies in 
important positions meant the government was loaded with his friends and those who shared his 
outlook and there were fewer people who would push back against him.  Often when Bush solicited 
Cheney’s views, Cheney was simply blessing recommendations which he or his allies had originated. 
As Lawrence Wilkerson put it:174 
His network is positioned almost everywhere in the government that's important. It was 
marvelous to watch his network work. ... His people attended, and rarely did they ever 
say anything; [they] just took good notes so that they could take it back and flummox the 
process wherever the vice president elected to flummox the process. ... Their modus 
operandi most of the time was to just be quiet, gather information and go back and tell the 
big guy. Then the big guy weighed in with the even bigger guy -- the president -- and 
generally speaking, got what he wanted. 
When the events of September 11 gave the war on terror paramount importance, Cheney, 
through Addington, was largely able to dominate legal policy regarding presidential power and the laws 
of war.  The leading figures in Bush’s administration were not lawyers and Attorney General Ashcroft  
increasingly  became an outsider as the first term wore on.  Bush’s first two counsels, Alberto Gonzales 
and Harriet Miers, were presidential cronies who were totally unversed in the legal areas which became 
most important.   
Addingon filled this vacuum.  He had encountered constitutional and statutory issues relating to 
national security throughout his career as a government lawyer as had another Cheney ally, Timothy 
Flanigan, who Cheney had conveniently installed as Gonzales’ deputy.  They were reinforced by the 
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relationship they developed with John Yoo at the Office of Legal Counsel and William Jim Haynes II, 
General Counsel of the Department of Defense and an alumnus of the Cheney Pentagon.175 
Addington was able to dominate legal policy  owing to his unfettered access to Gonzales and 
Miers and the work of their office.  Addington received copies of all documents sent to Gonzales and 
Miers and was invariably present when they conferred regarding an important legal issue.  He saw 
executive orders before they reached Bush and often substantially revised documents after others had 
already seen them.176  When Gonzales became Attorney General during Bush’s second term, Cheney’s 
office was again able to influence the work of the Office of Legal Counsel, a relationship which had been 
interrupted during Goldsmith’s brief tenure. 
Addington’s views had weight because of the common perception that he spoke for Cheney.  
Others recognized him as Cheney’s “eyes, ears, and voice.”  Those hearing Addington’s views in 
Gonzales’ office or elsewhere could reasonably assume they were hearing a preview of what Cheney 
would later tell Bush.177  Cheney’s clout with Bush gave those who preferred to be on the winning side 
on legal issues reason to concur in Addington’s prescriptions.  His power was largely derivative of 
Cheney’s influence. 
G) Absence of Constraint of Consensus Politics 
Cheney’s rejection of any form of consensus politics, both in dealing with Congress and with other 
nations, removed another important form of accountability.  Cheney’s rejection of the politics of 
consensus reduced the extent to which he needed to consider opposing views and either persuade or 
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accommodate them.  Although President-elect Bush made overtures which suggested that he would 
seek bipartisan consensus, even before the inauguration Cheney rejected all suggestions that Bush 
pursue consensus politics.  Appearing on Face the Nation on December  , 2000, Cheney declared that 
Bush had run on a platform “and we have no intention at all of backing off of it….The suggestion that 
somehow, because this was a close election, we should fundamentally change our beliefs I think is just 
silly.”178  When Cheney met with a handful of Republican moderate senators from the northeast shortly 
after the Court decided Bush v. Gore, he quickly rejected their suggestions that the new Bush 
administration modify its positions to seek bipartisan consensus.179 Cheney was undeterred when his 
approach drove Senator Jim Jeffords from the Republican party, thereby costing the Republicans control 
of the Senate during its first two years.   Two years later, Cheney justified resurrecting the idea of 
reducing the tax on corporate dividends, an idea which Treasury Secretary O’Neill viewed  as 
economically unsound, by asserting  “’We won the midterms.  This is our due.’”180  When he spoke to 
the Cabinet following Bush’s reelection, one of the narrowest in history, Cheney applauded Bush’s initial 
decision not to “’trim the sails’” and suggested that the 2004 election provided a mandate “’to complete 
the task,’”181 a somewhat optimistic interpretation in view of the narrow dimensions of the margin. 
Cheney demonstrated similar dispositions in international relations.  Cheney tended to have little 
patience with the notion that America should consult other nations in formulating foreign policy.  He 
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was the primary opponent of the notion that the United States should seek a United Nations resolution 
before attacking Iraq.182 
H) Noncompliance with Record Keeping Requirements 
Cheney’s aversion to accountability became most conspicuous in his efforts to escape compliance 
with legal requirements.  Cheney resisted complying with federal rules requiring that governmental 
offices report to the Information Security Oversight Office of the National Archive regarding handling of 
classified materials. The office of the Vice President had complied through 2002 at which point Cheney’s 
office argued that it was not subject to an executive order establishing a uniform system of protecting 
classified information by claiming that the Office of the Vice President was not an entity within the 
executive branch.183   Cheney advanced the position to resist an audit of the way in which his office 
handled classified information.   When officials at ISOO asked the Attorney General to rule that the Vice 
President was subject to the rules, Addington recommended eliminating the office by executive order.184 
Cheney’s position evoked widespread condemnation and mockery.  Representative Rahm 
Emanuel, the third ranking Democrat in the House, filed legislation to remove Cheney’s funding of $4.8 
million dollars from the executive branch budget.185  In response, Addington reserved, but backed off of, 
                                                           
182
 Woodward, supra note 51, at  157. 
183
 See Letter, U.S. Representative Henry Waxman to Vice President Cheney, (June 21, 2007) available at 
http://speaker.house.gov/blog/?p=507; Peter Baker, Cheney Defiant on Classified Material, Wash. Post, June 22, 
2007 at A01 available at http://washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/06/21AR2007062102309.html; 
Michael Isikoff, Challenging Cheney, Newsweek, Dec. 24, 2007 http://www.newsweek.com/id/81883; Scott Shane, 
Agency is Target in Cheney Fight on Secrecy Data, N. Y. Times, June 22, 2007, at 1 available at 
hyttp://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/22/Washington/22cheney.html. 
184
  Isikoff, supra note 183. 
185
 Mike Allen, Dems Force Cheney to Flip-Flop on Secret Docs, The Politico, June 27, 2007, 
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0607/4670.html; Michael Abramowitz, Cheney Aide Explains Stance on 
Classified Material, Wash. Post, June 27, 2007 at A05 available at  http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2007/06/26/AR2007062602052.html  
that constitutional claim, interposing instead a new justification for exemption based upon a reading of 
“agencies” in the executive order.186  Less than two  months later, Cheney’s office reasserted the 
position that it was not part of the executive branch, this time in resisting a subpoena relating to 
documents regarding warrantless surveillance.187 
Cheney’s position seemed inconsistent with positions previously taken.  For instance, in 
Cheney’s appeal to the Supreme Court in Cheney v. United States District Court for the District of 
Columbia, he essentially characterized himself as an actor in the executive branch.  Cheney’s legal filings 
identified himself as a “close” and “senior” presidential advisor acting within the Executive Branch “to 
fulfill core Executive Branch functions under Article II of the Constitution.”  Cheney suggested he should 
enjoy the same prerogatives as the President.188  Cheney should benefit from the presumption of 
regularity which attaches to conduct of officials of the Executive branch, particularly those of the rank of 
President and Vice President.189  In the dispute with ISOO, however, he claimed, in part, that he was not 
part of the executive branch to escape reporting requirements regarding classified records.  His ability to 
exalt form over substance flowed in part from his lack of political ambition which minimized the 
consequences to him of adverse political reaction.   
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Some suggested that Cheney was creating his own branch of government.190  More precisely, 
Cheney advanced the claim that he straddled the two political branches as a way to escape 
accountability.  When expedient to do so, he claimed the privileges associated with each but denied 
membership in either to avoid disclosure duties imposed on both. 
VI) Conclusion 
Cheney began to lose some influence during the second term.  Gellman traces Cheney’s decline to 
his mishandling of the reauthorization of the domestic surveillance program in March, 2004 when Bush 
saw, perhaps for the first time, the potential political consequences of allowing Cheney such latitude in 
view of the low priority the Vice President gave political considerations.191   Yet Cheney retained 
formidable power even after that date.    When Gonzales replaced Ashcroft as Attorney General and 
Harriet Miers became the new White House counsel, Cheney’s influence over legal policy was restored.  
His office blocked the appointment of Patrick Philbin to head OLC –he had worked with Goldsmith on 
revising Yoo’s memoranda—and supported that of Stephen Bradbury who wrote an opinion authorizing 
CIA interrogators to use numerous techniques.  When Comey objected to Bradbury’s memoranda, 
Gonzales told him he was under enormous pressure from Cheney to acquiesce.192  Cheney played a 
leading role in creating the short list of Supreme Court candidates and in interviewing Judges John 
Roberts and Samuel Alito.193 
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Yet other events eroded Cheney’s position.  In March, 2006, Bush replaced Card as Chief of Staff 
with Joshua Bolten who asserted more control over White House decision-making.  In November, 2006, 
Bush fired Cheney’s ally, Rumsfeld, over Cheney’s objections, replacing him with the more independent 
minded and pragmatic Robert Gates.  Cheney began to lose some internal arguments in a new national 
security context in which Rumsfeld no longer reinforced his predilections, in which Gates was more 
independent and in which Rice had greater influence with Bush than had Powell.   Rice persuaded Bush 
to take a less bellicose approach to Iran and North Korea, contrary to Cheney’s urgings.194   
Cheney’s standing was also hurt by two unique events—the trial and conviction of Libby, Cheney’s 
chief of staff, for perjury with its embarrassing disclosures about Cheney’s office, and the incident in 
which Cheney shot a fellow hunter.  Both cast Cheney in a negative light and eroded his public standing.  
The Iraq war, which Cheney had championed, went poorly as many of the events Cheney had 
confidently predicted (e.g. the discovery of weapons of mass destruction, heroic welcome by the Iraqi 
people) did not materialize.  Cheney’s popularity reached record lows.  Although Bush commuted 
Libby’s sentence, he refused, despite Cheney’s persistent efforts, to pardon him.195 
 Notwithstanding these defeats, Cheney exercised a level of power as vice president which would 
have exceeded the imagination of virtually anyone who has held, or thought about, that office during its 
220 year existence.  Yet as striking as the power Cheney exercised was Cheney’s ability to insulate 
himself from the sort of informal checks which had held past Vice Presidents, and other presidential 
subordinates, accountable.    Had some of the checks remained in place, Cheney’s authority would have 
been lessened and policy-making in the Bush administration might have taken a different course.  A 
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different President would not have granted Cheney such autonomy or been so indifferent to process or 
failed to recognize the implications of placing the initial transition in the Vice President’s hands.  A 
different Vice President would have exercised more self-restraint or would not have been so oblivious to 
the impact of decisions on his or her political future or so indifferent to bipartisanship or multilateralism 
or viewed process as something to manipulate rather than as a vehicle to promote deliberative decision-
making.   
The Cheney vice presidency developed in the unique way it did due to the confluence of a 
variety of factors which maximized vice-presidential power while minimizing vice-presidential 
accountability.  The war on terror was certainly among those factors.  It contributed to the exercise of 
sweeping presidential, and vice-presidential, powers during the Bush-Cheney years.    Yet before and 
independent of the events of September 11, 2001, the course was set to aggrandize the presidency and 
to create a largely unaccountable Cheney vice presidency. 
It would be a mistake to regard the Cheney service as an indictment of the vice presidency.  That 
institution, like any other political office, is subject to abuse and carries no guarantee of exemplary 
performance.  Yet the trajectory of the office, especially since the Mondale period, is promising and has 
represented one of the real success stories in American government.    The continuing challenge is to 
construct in each administration a menu of activities which will allow the Vice President to contribute as 
an advisor and trouble-shooter in a way which makes his or her exercise of power accountable.  The 
failure of Bush and Cheney to do so constitutes one of the failures of their tenure. 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
